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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONTRACT TO DiVmE FEEs WITH LAYEnN.-A re-
cent decision attests the ever increasing emphasis upon the professional ethics
of the bar. Two laymen sued in equity for an injunction against their part-
ner, an attorney, to prevent his further handling the assets of their partner-
ship. The court found as a natural inference from the contract and sur-
rounding circumstances that the plaintiffs had collected and submitted vet-
erans' war claims to the defendant in consideration of a share in the latter's
fees. Held-such an agreement between an attorney and laymen is cham-
pertous and utterly void as against public policy. Waychoff et al. v. Way-
choff (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932) 163 Atl. 670.
Similar treatment of "ambulance chasing" contracts prevails in federal and
state courts. Meguire v. Corwine (1880) 101 U. S. 108; Alpers v. Hunt
(1890) 86 Cal. 78, 24 Pac. 846; Langdon v. Conlin (1903) 67 Neb. 243, 93
N. W. 389; Holland v. Sheehan (1909) 108 Minn. 362, 122 N. W. 1; Chreste v.
Louisville R. Co. (1917) 173 Ky. 486, 191 S. W. 265. In some jurisdictions the
rule applies to such a contract between two lawyers. Ellis v. FTawley (1917)
165 Wis. 301, 161 N. W. 364. Disbarment may result. In Re Clark (1906)
184 N. Y. 222, 77 N. E. 1; Chreste v. Commonwealth (1916) 171 Ky. 77, 186
S. W. 919. See, for the "ethical" attitude the Canons of the American Bar
Association adopted by the American Law Institute. 33 Reports Amer. Bar
Assoc. (1908) p. 582; Restatement of Contracts, sec. 546.
This rule, however, in the past has not been uniformly applied. The courts
at times have in positive terms rejected it. Voche v. Peters (1895) 58 II.
App. 338; Kelerher & Little v. Henderson (1907) 203 Mo. 498, 101 S. W. 1083.
An interesting New York case, which has never been overruled, held such a
contract voidable only. A broker contracted with an attorney to collect cus-
toms claims and submit them to the latter for litigation; he was allowed re-
covery on the contract, the court ruling that champerty as at common law did
not exist in the state; hence the matter was controlled only by a statute for-
bidding an attorney's entering into such a contract, and as against the at-
torney the contract was valid, although unenforcible against the layman.
Irwin v. Curie (1902) 171 N. Y. 409, 64 N. E. 161. A similar result was
reached in Dunne v. Herrick (1890) 37 Ill. App. 180. In view of the prin-
cipal case and the increasing demand for a more stringently enforced code of
legal ethics, such decisions as these probably will become rarer in the future.
The work is being aided by statutes. See for example G. L. Mass (1932) ch.
221 sec. 43; C. S. N. Y. (Cahill 1930) ch. 41 sec. 274; Wis. Laws (1931) sec.
266.45; G. L. Cal. (1931) Act. 5401.
The laxity of the Missouri rule in the Kelerher case above cited was cor-
rected by the Practice Act of 1915: "It shall be unlawful for any licensed
attorney in the State of Missouri to divide any fees or compensation received
by him in the 'practice of law' or in 'doing law business' with any person not
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a licensed attorney or any firm not wholly composed of licensed attorneys
. . ." R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 11694. See also sees. 11692 and 11693. For a case
under the statute see Carey v. Gossom (1920) 204 Mo. App. 695, 218 S. W. 917.
Contracts to solicit business are apparently unaffected by the statute where
both parties are lawyers.
Assuming that the "chaser" contract is declared void for champerty the in-
teresting question arises as to whether the lawyer can recover under a
quantum meruit for the reasonable value of his services. The precise ques-
tion has not been much litigated; but where it has the courts have answered
in the negative. Gammons v. Johnson (1899) 76 Minn. 76, 78 N. W. 1035;
Gammons v. Gulbrauson (1899) 78 Minn. 21, 80 N. W. 779; Ellis a'. Frawley,
supra. C. B. P. '35.
BANKS AND BANKING-POWER OF BANK TO GiVn SECURITY FOR DEPoSITS.-
To secure the waiver of a requirement that the repayment of a deposit by
the receiver of a railroad company with the defendant national bank should
be secured by a surety bond, the bank agreed to post as collateral security for
the deposit Liberty Bonds with a face value equal to the amount of the de-
posit. The motive for this arrangement was a desire to save the expense of
premiums charged by the surety company for the bond. Subsequently the
bank failed. The receiver of the railroad company attempted to force the
liquidator of the bank to turn over the Liberty Bonds. Held: The national
bank had no power under the national banking laws to pledge its assets as
collateral security for private deposits. Since the contract was ultra vires
the bank, the liquidator of the bank could hold the bonds free of any claim by
the receiver of the railroad. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Pottorff (C. C. A. 5,
1933) 63 F. (2d) 1.
There are relatively few cases which have passed upon the power of
national banks to pledge their assets to secure private deposits. Two early
cases dealing with state banks assert that this power exists even though not
expressly conferred by statute since the power given to receive deposits im-
plies the power to make the agreements considered necessary to secure these
deposits. Ward v. Johnson (1880) 95 Ill. 215; Ah v. Rhoads (1877) 84
Pa. 319. With reference to national banks the power was denied in Smith
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1932) 56 F. (2d) 799. The discus-
sion in this latter case is very interesting as showing the respect paid by the
courts to the decisions of administrative officers even as to questions of law.
The majority of the court pointed out that the Comptroller of the Currency
had repeatedly advised the national banks that they had no such power. The
decision glosses over the fact that the same official had ruled that there was
such power as to public deposits. Judge Dickinson dissented in the Smith
case on the ground that it was a common practice to give such collateral se-
curity and that there was no distinction between deposits of political subdi-
visions of states and private deposits when national banks were concerned.
The first reason for this dissent is especially interesting in view of the fact
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